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Abstract
Unemployment insurance (UI) sanctions in the form of benefit reductions are intended
to set disincentives for UI recipients to stay unemployed. Empirical evidence about the
effects of UI sanctions in Germany is sparse. Using administrative data we investigate
the effects of sanctions on the reemployment probability in West Germany for individuals
who entered UI receipt between April 2000 and March 2001. By applying a matching
approach that takes timing of events into account, we identify the ex post effect of UI
sanctions. As a robustness check a difference-in-differences matching estimator is applied.
The results indicate positive effects on the employment probability in regular employment
for both women and men.
JEL classification: J64, J65, J68
Keywords: Unemployment insurance sanctions; dynamic matching
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1 Introduction
In the last years activation strategies intended to get unemployed individuals back to em-
ployment have become increasingly important. Besides active labour market policies
(ALMP), activation strategies include regular reporting and confirmation of unemployment
status, monitoring of the job-search efforts and/or action plans (Tergeist/Grubb, 2006). Un-
employment insurance (UI) benefits usually depend on several eligibility criteria, i.e. UI
benefit recipients have to comply with certain rules in order to be eligible for UI benefits1.
In this context, punitive sanctions have received increasingly more attention. UI benefit
sanctions in the form of benefit reductions are intended to set an incentive for UI recipients
to reenter work.
Studies on punitive sanctions usually distinguish between an ex ante effect of a sanction
and an ex post effect. If the mere possibility of being sanctioned raises the search efforts
of UI recipients ex ante, this is called the ex ante effect, while the effect arising from the
actual imposition of a sanction is called the ex post effect. According to job search theory,
at the moment of the imposition of a sanction an individual will search for a job more
intensely and lower his/her reservation wage, which finally will raise the transition rate into
employment. In this paper we focus on the ex post effect of UI sanctions in Germany for a
random sample of persons who entered UI receipt from April 2000 until March 2001 in West
Germany2. Our main question is whether the imposition of a UI sanction due to refusing
a placement proposition3 or an ALMP training sets an incentive to reenter work. The key
outcome variable is the employment probability after a sanction has been imposed. As
we do not have experimental data, where treatment is implemented randomly we have to
be aware of a potential selection bias due to endogeneity of treatment. We respond to
this problem by using a control group that is built by matching algorithms. We apply a
propensity score matching approach that takes timing of events into account by dividing
the sample into three different strata of individual unemployment durations. The treatment
group consists of those UI recipients who were sanctioned during the stratum considered
(and not before), while the controls are the ones who have not been sanctioned during
the stratum considered (and neither before) and who are still in UI receipt at the start of
the week of the sanction. Using informative data of the federal employment agency (FEA)
we rely on the assumption of conditional independence and present the identification and
the estimation of the ex post effect of UI sanctions. As a robustness check, we apply a
difference-in-differences matching estimator.
2 Literature review
There are several studies about the effects of punitive sanctions (e.g. Fredriksson/Holmlund
(2003); Jensen/Rosholm/Svarer (2003); Boone/Sadrieh/van Ours (2004)). In general, re-
sults of most of these studies show that punitive sanctions have a positive impact on
1 The term unemployment insurance benefits is used for the German term "Arbeitslosengeld I".
2 Since during the observation period the sanction rates in East Germany were about half of those in West
Germany this analysis is restricted to West Germany.
3 A placement proposition is a job vacancy that the caseworker proposes to the UI recipient.
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the transition from unemployment to employment. In a theoretical contribution Fredriks-
son/Holmlund (2003) analyse time limits of UI payment duration, monitoring in combination
with sanctions and workfare as three crucial features of UI policies. Their simulations
show that in a system with monitoring and sanctions, search incentives are set most ef-
fectively. Jensen/Rosholm/Svarer (2003) analyse the effects of a youth unemployment
program (YUP) on the transition rates from unemployment to schooling and employment
using quasi-experimental data. They focus on three different effects within this program:
an announcement effect, a direct programme effect, and a sanction effect. While they did
not find evidence for an effect of mere announcement of the YUP in form of a letter, ac-
cording to their research results the program itself and also (somewhat weaker) sanctions
have a positive effect on the transition rate out of unemployment among young Danish un-
employed. Boone/Sadrieh/van Ours (2004) use data of an experiment among 62 students
in order to investigate ex ante and ex post effects of unemployment benefit sanctions and
find evidence for both. Their results suggest that the effect of the possibility of being sanc-
tioned (ex ante effect) is stronger than the effect of the actual imposition of a sanction (ex
post effect). These articles investigate the ex post effects of sanctions either with experi-
mental data or they do not investigate the ex post effect explicitly or only for a subgroup of
young unemployed (Jensen/Rosholm/Svarer, 2003). In contrast, the following studies iden-
tify the ex post effect with non-experimental data using survival analysis: Abbring/van den
Berg/van Ours (2005), Lalive/van Ours/Zweimüller (2005), van den Berg/Klaauw/van Ours
(2004), Svarer (2007) and Müller/Steiner (2008).
Abbring/van den Berg/van Ours (2005) use administrative data of persons who entered
unemployment in 1992 and analyse the ex post effects of UI sanctions in the Netherlands.
The sanctions they analyse range from a 5% benefit reduction for four weeks up to a
30% benefit reduction for 13 weeks. Their results indicate that punitive sanctions signif-
icantly raise individual transition rates into employment of UI recipients. The increase of
the transition rates they found ranges from 36% for males in the banking sector to 98% for
females in the metal industry sector. By using administrative data of Switzerland Lalive/van
Ours/Zweimüller (2005) are able to analyse the effects of sanctions more precisely as they
were able to distinguish between the ex ante and the ex post effect explicitly. The UI sanc-
tion they analyse is a 100% benefit reduction ranging from 14 to 60 days. Their results on
the ex post effect indicate that unemployment duration decreases by about three weeks
due to the announcement and the actual imposition of the UI sanction. According to their
results, these effects can be separated from each other: the exit rate from unemployment
increases by 28% after a warning has been imposed, whereas the actual imposition of a
sanction additionally increases the exit rate by 23%.4 While the analysis of Abbring/van den
Berg/van Ours (2005) and Lalive/van Ours/Zweimüller (2005) focus on the group of UI ben-
efit recipients, van den Berg/Klaauw/van Ours (2004) investigate ex post effects of punitive
sanctions on welfare recipients. Using administrative data from Rotterdam they find an in-
crease of the transition rate from welfare to work after a sanction was imposed. According
to their results, the hazard to leave unemployment is about twice as large as before. Svarer
(2007) investigates the effects of sanctions on the exit rate from unemployment in a sample
4 According to their results on the ex ante effect a one standard deviation increase in the strictness of the
sanction policy will reduce individual unemployment duration by one week.
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of Danish unemployed and finds empirical evidence for ex post as well as ex ante effects.
According to his results the exit rate is increased by more than 50% after the imposition of
a sanction. Finally, Müller/Steiner (2008) analyse ex post effects of sanctions on UI as well
as unemployment assistance (UA) recipients in Germany. They find positive short- and
long-term effects of benefit sanctions on the transition from unemployment to employment.
In sum, the studies we found on the ex post effect of sanctions used survival analysis and
found positive incentive effects of sanctions.
Additionally two studies on the determinants of being sanctioned were found:
Müller/Oschmiansky (2006) focus on a model of the determinants of regional sanction rates
in Germany.5 Their findings suggest that there are different levels of determinants of a
sanction, i.e. a sanction is not only determined by the individual’s behaviour itself. Ac-
cording to results of Müller (2007) who analysed the determinants of being sanctioned at
the individual level, the age, the level of disability and the qualification, but also the local
sanction policy affect the individual sanction risk.
3 Unemployment benefit sanctions in Germany
During our observation period6, UI benefits were paid if a person had been employed in a
job subject to social contribution for at least 12 months within the seven years previous to
unemployment. It depended on the duration of the previous employment period and the
age for how many months unemployment insurance was paid. The maximum duration of UI
benefits receipt was 32 months for people who were older than 56 years old and who had
been employed for at least 64 months in the seven year previous to unemployment.7 Until
2005 a UI benefit recipient received means-tested unemployment assistance (UA) after his
claims to UI benefits terminated. Table 1 gives an overview of the entitlement lengths of UI
benefits during our observation period.
The monthly benefit amount received was 67% of the previous monthly net wage for un-
employed persons with children and 60% for those without a dependent child.8 The time
period of employment relevant for the calculation of the monthly UI benefits amount was
12 months.
In the years 2000 and 2001 there were neither changes in the sanction legislation nor in
the labour market policy affecting sanctions (Karasch, 2005). An unemployment benefit
recipient was sanctioned if he did not comply with certain rules. In case of both, short-term
and long-term sanctions, UI or UA benefits stopped completely for a certain period. In
general there were five sanction reasons: (1) If a person had voluntarily quit his job, the
5 Müller/Oschmiansky (2006) define the sanction rate as the ratio between the sum of effective sanctions
imposed in a local employment agency due to refusal of a placement proposition or of an ALMP measure,
and the stock of benefit (UI, unemployment assistance (UA), integration aid) recipients of the respective
local employment agency.
6 We use an inflow sample into UI benefits between April 2000 and March 2001.
7 In 2006 changes of Social Code (SC) III have decreased UI entitlement lengths for various age groups, e.g.
possible duration of UI benefits receipt was limited to 18 months for persons older than 54.
8 The replacement ratio for UA was 57% and 53% respectively.
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entitlement time for UI benefits was shortened by 25% or at least twelve weeks, i.e. the
person did not receive UI benefits at all at least for the first twelve weeks of unemployment.
In case of hardship the sanction could be limited to six weeks and if the job would have
ended within four weeks anyway, the person was sanctioned by three weeks only. (2)
If he refused work, in the sense that he refused to apply for a reasonable job that was
proposed to him (placement proposition) or that he refused a reasonable job that was
offered to him, a person was sanctioned by twelve weeks and three weeks respectively
if the job would have been temporary only. (3) Refusing or (4) dropping out of an ALMP
measure caused a sanction of twelve weeks and six weeks, respectively, if the measure
was intended to be less than six weeks. Finally, if an unemployed person failed to report
to the local employment agency or to a medical or psychological appointment (5), the UI
benefits stopped for two weeks. The different types of sanctions according to the SC III
valid in 2000/2001 are summarized in Table 2. If the cumulated duration of sanctions adds
up to 24 weeks, a UI recipient lost the claim to UI benefits ("sanctions account regulation").
Sanctions are not implemented automatically, but at the discretion of the local employment
agency and even the caseworkers. Empirically, sanctions are implemented quite heteroge-
neously between local employment agencies (Müller/Oschmiansky, 2006) and even within
one local employment agency we assume the probability of one person to be sanctioned
to be influenced by the assigned caseworker.
From 1996 until 2003, the yearly sanction rates in West Germany, calculated as total num-
ber of sanctions divided by the stock of UI and UA recipients, ranged between 9.7% in
1997 and 13.6% in 2001, while in East Germany in general the sanction rates were lower:
they ranged between 4.1% in 1997 and about 6% in 1999 and 2003 (see figure 1). Sanc-
tion rates differ by the type of sanctions. Most sanctions are implemented due to voluntary
quits: 75.7% in 2000 and 75% in 2001 (see Table 3 for West Germany). The abrupt jump
of the share of sanctions due to refusal of work in 2003 is most probably caused by an
internal circular of the employment agency (Rundbrief 55/03) in which the local employ-
ment agencies and the caseworkers were called on to activate unemployed persons more
effectively. We will use this observation to support the idea of exogenous variation in the
individual sanction probability.
According to job search theory those sanctions are of interest in relation to the ex post
effectiveness that are imposed during open unemployment. Thus we do not analyse the
effects of sanction types (1) and (4). As short-term sanctions due to not showing up at
the agency (5) are assumed to be very different to long-term sanctions regarding their
implementation, they are analysed separately. In the empirical analysis below we focus on
the effects of sanctions due to refusal of placement propositions (2) or an ALMP measure
(3).
4 Job-search-theory with sanctions
The theoretical framework is a job search model with sanctions introduced by Abbring/van den
Berg/van Ours (1996, 2005), the latter referred to as ABO05. Before we derive a hypothe-
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sis on the sanction effect, it is useful to present some general thoughts about a UI system
with sanctions. A basic job search model with endogenous search intensity is presented
e.g. by Mortensen (1986). ABO05 extend this model by introducing sanctions. Following
ABO05, we consider a situation where an individual has become unemployed and currently
is searching for a job. We take different parameters into account that are assumed to in-
fluence the job search process. First, UI recipients receive a certain flow of unemployment
benefits b. We assume that besides the pecuniary value of the UI benefits, there is a non-
pecuniary utility of being unemployed which is also included in b. Second, we assume that
every UI recipient searches with a particular search intensity s. The level of s is chosen by
the individual himself. Third, the rate at which job offers arrive is defined as λ(s), where
λ(s) is increasing in s, i.e. the more intensely a UI recipient will search for a job, the more
likely he will be offered a job. The wage that is offered is randomly drawn out of a wage
offer distribution F (w). If a job is offered the UI recipient has to decide whether to accept
the job given the wage offered or to search further. Fourth, the search costs c(s) increase
in s, i.e. the more intensely he searches for a job, the higher the search costs. As our
model is based in a world with rational actors, we assume that every UI recipient aims to
maximize his expected present value of income over an infinite horizon of time. Finally,
it is the reservation wage φ together with the search intensity s that defines the optimal
strategy of a UI recipient. Following ABO05 we introduce sanctions in this model. We
denote the benefit level a UI recipient receives before a sanction is imposed by b1. The
level of reduction when a sanction is imposed is denoted by r, thus we have b2 = (1-r)b1
being the benefit level a UI recipient receives after a sanction is imposed. We distinguish
two different aspects of sanctions: the institutional aspect meaning the individual acts in a
world where he might be sanctioned (ex ante) and the aspect of the actual imposition of
a sanction (ex post). We consider a UI recipient in a system with sanctions. At first sight
one might assume that every UI recipient tries to avoid sanctions. If this was the case and
it was possible to avoid sanctions we would not observe sanctions at all. At second sight
we might think that UI recipients can perfectly anticipate when a sanction is imposed and
define their choices accordingly. This is disproved by ABO05 empirically.
A major assumption of their model is that individuals cannot foresee when exactly a sanc-
tion is imposed, which corresponds to the so called no-anticipation assumption. ABO05
base this assumption on the observation of regional differences in the strictness with which
sanctions are applied. Müller (2007) presents very similar findings for Germany: the tran-
sition into a sanction is not only influenced by individual characteristics but also by the
strictness of the local employment agency.
Yet we assume, unemployed individuals do know the relationship between their behaviour
and the probability of being sanctioned. If the job search intensity exceeds a certain thresh-
old s∗ we assume that the probability of being sanctioned is zero. The rate at which a
sanction might arrive, i.e. the probability of being sanctioned given no sanction has yet
been imposed, is given by p(s), with p decreasing in s.
p(s) =
p0 > 0 if s < s∗0 if s ≥ s∗. (1)
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According to equation (1), the more intensely a person searches for a job the lower is the
probability of being sanctioned. We assume that the punitive effect of being sanctioned
is so severe that the person immediately after the imposition of a sanction will raise his
search intensity to a level beyond s∗ (s ≥ s∗).9 In order to identify the optimal strategy of
an unemployed individual we assume Ri to be the expected present value of income, φi to
be the reservation wage and si the search intensity with i = 1, 2 where i = 1 relates to the
time period before the imposition of a sanction and i = 2 relates to the time period after
the imposition of a sanction, respectively. Now we use the Bellman equation to express the
expected returns to assets:
ρR1 = max
s1
[
bw − 1
2
c0s
2
1 + λ0s1
∫ ∞
φ1
(
w
ρ
−R1)dF (w) + I(s1 < s∗)p0(R2 −R1)
]
(2)
ρR2 = max
s2|s2≥s∗
[
(1− r)bw − 1
2
c0s
2
2 + λ0s2
∫ ∞
φ2
(
w
ρ
−R2)dF (w)
]
, (3)
with ρR1 =φ1 (reservation wage before the imposition of a sanction) and ρR2 =φ2 (reser-
vation wage after the imposition of a sanction). I(s1 < s∗) denotes the indicator function
being one if the search intensity is below the threshold level s∗ and being zero otherwise,
i.e. if the probability of being sanctioned is zero. We interpret the right hand side of the
equations (2) and (3) as the expected flow of income given the search strategy. In equation
(2) this expected flow consists of the following parts:
the utility of unemployment (bw – 12 c0s
2
1),
expected additional income when a job is found (the job offer arrival rate times the
expected gain of finding a job compared to staying unemployed),
the expected income drop when a sanction is imposed (I(s1 < s∗)p0 (R2-R1)).
The transition rate from unemployment to employment is assumed to depend on the offer
arrival rate λ0, the search intensity si, and the distribution of the reservation wage F¯ (φi). It
is given by:
θu,1 = λ0s1F¯ (φ1) (4)
θu,2 = λ0s2F¯ (φ2), (5)
with F¯ = 1− F .
Regarding the transition rate out of unemployment into employment, this model allows to
derive the hypothesis that at the moment at which a sanction is imposed the transition
rate from unemployment to employment jumps upwards. This hypothesis is based on the
following relations: the expected present value of income after a sanction is lower than
expected present value of income before the imposition of a sanction (R2 < R1), because a
9 The model requires some more assumptions (ABO05): λ(s)= λ0s and c(s)= 12 c0 s
2. Upon imposition of
a sanction, b is permanently reduced from b1 (benefits level before a sanction is imposed) to b2 (benefits
level after a sanction is imposed). b1, F, λ0, c0, p0, s∗ and the discount rate ρ are constant. An implication
of these assumptions is that the optimal strategy the individual chooses is constant within the time interval
before a sanction and within the time interval after a sanction. p0, λ0 and c0 are exogenous parameters.
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sanction reduces the flow of benefits ((1-r) b1 < b1) and the choice of search intensity after
a sanction is restricted by s2 ≥ s∗. The fact that R2 < R1 implies that the reservation wage
falls at the moment of the imposition of a sanction (φ2 < φ1), so F¯ (φ2)> F¯ (φ1). s2 = s∗
also holds, while s1 < s∗ because otherwise a sanction could not have been imposed. This
implies that s2 > s1. In sum, we expect the transition rate to jump upwards in the moment
when a sanction is imposed (θu,2 > θu,1). Regarding the probability of being employed after
a UI sanction we derive the following hypothesis:
A UI sanction raises the probability of being employed after it has been imposed.
Though it is not focus of the empirical analysis of this paper, the model allows to derive
further mechanisms, e.g. by changing r or p0: The relation between the level of reduction
r and the search intensities s1 and s2 can be derived from equations (2) and (3): the higher
the reduction r the higher will be the expected negative income change, which will raise s1
ex ante. An increase in r will also lead to an increase of s2 as the gain of finding a job will
increase due to the decrease in the utility of staying unemployed. Whether a rise in p0 has
a positive or a negative effect on the search intensity, depends on whether a sanction has
been imposed yet or not. Boone/van Ours (2000) show that the (ex ante) effect on s1 is
positive, while the (ex post) effect on the difference between s1 and s2 effect is negative.
Thus if p0 is increased due to an increased monitoring, the ex post effect will decrease.
5 Identification strategy
As we do not have experimental data, where treatment is implemented randomly and thus
can be treated as exogenous, we have to control for non-random assignment to treatment,
i.e. for the natural selection process. Factors that influence assignment to treatment partly
influence the outcome of interest. Therefore treatment and control group would receive
different outcomes anyway, even without treatment. We choose our evaluation approach
taking the endogeneity of treatment into account.10
As we want to evaluate the ex post effect of UI sanctions on the reemployment probability
of a sanctioned person, we have to face the fundamental evaluation problem: we want to
compare the outcome of a sanctioned person i (Y 1i ) with the outcome of the same person
i in the situation without having been sanctioned (Y 0i ) at the same point in time (the so
called counterfactual outcome). Accordingly, the individual causal effect is the difference
between these two outcomes: ∆i=Y 1i – Y
0
i . We can either observe one state or the other,
i.e. the individual outcome we can observe is: Yi = Y 1i · Di + Y 0i · (1 –Di) with Di ² {0,1}.
The evaluation problem refers to the fact that we cannot observe the individual causal
effect. Our approach to tackle the evaluation problem is to estimate the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT ). In our study the ATT is the expected effect of a sanction for
sanctioned UI recipients:
∆ATT = E(Y 1 − Y 0|X,D = 1) = E(Y 1|X,D = 1)− E(Y 0|X,D = 1), (6)
10 For an early discussion of the consequences of self selection see Heckman (1979).
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where the average outcome of the treated in the state of being untreated, E(Y 0|X,D =
1), is not observable. What we do observe though is the outcome of the untreated:
E(Y 0|X,D = 0).
5.1 Static matching approach
The method of matching can be applied to estimate the ATT if the data is sufficiently rich.
Since out data meet this requirement, we chose this method. Matching is based on the
assumption, that conditional on the observables X that are not affected by treatment and
known by the researcher, Y0 is independent of treatment assignment, i.e.:
Y0 ‖ D|X.11 (A.1)
If assumption (A.1) holds, then E(Y 0|X,D = 1) = E(Y 0|X,D = 0), which implies that
selection bias does not occur as we have found an appropriate substitute for our unob-
servable outcome (E(Y 0|X,D = 1)). In other words we have to find a "statistical twin"
regarding all variables ofX. This intention is quite data demanding as the more dimensions
X has the more individuals would be needed to satisfy this assumption.
Rosenbaum/Rubin (1983) propose a matching method where individuals are not matched
conditional on X but on their conditional probability, to be assigned to treatment given X,
which they call the propensity score: P (X) = Pr(D = 1|X). They show that if (A.1) is
satisfied, then
Y0 ‖ D|P (X), (A.2)
provided the probability of the non-treated to receive treatment is positive (0 < P (X) < 1).
An implication of (A.2) is that
E(Y 0|P (X), D = 1) = E(Y 0|P (X), D = 0), (7)
so that our results are not biased even when conditioning on the propensity score. Thus
when (A.2), also known as conditional independence assumption (CIA) holds, we can iden-
tify the ATT .12 In order to fulfill (A.2), we need to control for all factors that affect both, the
probability of a sanction and the probability to get back into employment.
5.2 Dynamic matching approach
As we are interested in the ex post effect of a sanction after the sanction has been imposed,
we are confronted with a missing data problem not only for the term E(Y 0|X,D = 1) but
also for the point in time when treatment is not implemented for untreated people. In
our case treatment may start at any time the person receives UI benefits. In order to
11 The stronger version of this assumption is (Y0, Y1) ‖ D|X (Heckman et al., 1998). As we concentrate on
the ATT , i.e. we concentrate on the effect of a sanction on behaviour of the sanctioned persons and not
on the effects of a lack of a sanction on the behaviour of the non-sanctioned persons, the use of Y0 ‖ D|X
is sufficient.
12 Additionally the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTV A) has to hold: potential outcomes and
potential treatment status of each individual are independent of potential outcomes and potential treatment
status of all other individuals. As treatment in our case is a seldom event as we will see in chapter 7.1 this
assumption is plausible to hold. At the same time we assume the ex ante effect to be very low.
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account for a potential selectivity bias due to time-constant unobserved heterogeneity Ab-
bring/Berg (2003) suggest a mixed proportional hazard model, the timing of events model,
where the duration until treatment and the duration of unemployment are modelled jointly
(for an application see e.g. Abbring/van den Berg/van Ours (2005)). Applying the timing of
events approach one has to be careful at specifying the model: according to the findings
in Gaure/Roed/Zhang (2007), imposing unjustified restrictions on the heterogeneity distri-
bution can cause substantial bias. Moreover, the proportional hazard specification already
imposes functional form restrictions in the outcome equation, that could bias parameter es-
timates. Such functional form restrictions are not imposed by propensity score matching.
We do not apply the timing of events approach here, but regard it as an alternative to the
matching approach.
In this subsection we address the question how we deal with the missing start date of
treatment for the untreated. There are different approaches to solve the problem of missing
start dates applying matching estimators.13 Fredriksson/Johansson (2004) point out the
importance of the dynamic process of treatment assignment. According to their results
using a time window defined by the treatment information observed in the data at hand
in order to define who is treated and who is not treated is problematic: an estimator with
a binary treatment indicator that is based on such a time window is always biased as it
conditions on the future.
In this article we follow Sianesi (2004) and Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2007) and use an
evaluation approach that takes timing of treatment into account. We estimate the effect of
being sanctioned in stratum u, defined as a short time interval during the UI spell, on the
outcome variable, the labour market status in different months t after the stratum u, Yt (with
t > u). Each stratum u consists of a two month period counting from the individual start
of UI receipt. The treatment indicator of stratum u is denoted by D(u) = 1 for individuals
being sanctioned in stratum u and D(u) = 0 for those neither having been sanctioned
before stratum u nor being sanctioned within stratum u. Thus we distinguish between
different treatment periods: the three strata u. By applying this approach, treatment and
outcome decisions of the past are taken into account, i.e. the approach controls for the
dynamic sorting process of treated and controls into the group of being at risk of being
sanctioned.14 Using the matching approach in such a stratified manner one allows for an
interaction of the treatment effects with the dynamic sorting process and for heterogenous
treatment among the different strata considered (Fitzenberger/Speckesser, 2007).
In order to avoid that individuals who are sanctioned during a certain week of a stratum are
matched to individuals who have already left UI receipt before this week, we divide each
stratum into eight weekly treatment intervals usplit and for each usplit we exclude those from
the analysis who are not at risk of being sanctioned anymore during the respective week
13 For a number of different approaches to solve the missing start date problem see Lechner (1999a).
14 There are two reasons for defining a two months period as one stratum: first, a relatively short period
as observation window, reduces the potential bias due to conditioning on future outcomes described in
Fredriksson/Johansson (2004). Second, the shorter the strata are defined the more precisely this approach
is able to control for the dynamic sorting process. Ideally, one would estimate daily probit models. This is
not possible due to the small number of sanctions. Instead we chose the two months period and argue that
within these two months treatment is exogenous, i.e. the exact start date of a sanction within a stratum is
not influenced by the elapsed duration of UI receipt. As the absolute numbers of sanctions per month in our
sample after month six is relatively small (see figure 2), the empirical analysis is restricted to three strata.
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as their UI receipt ended before. Our estimator of interest is the difference in the labour
market status over time between those who were sanctioned in stratum u and those not
having been sanctioned up to the end of u but still being in UI receipt at usplit (L > usplit−1,
with L being the total weeks of UI receipt and usplit−1 denoting the end of the week before
usplit), i.e. being at the risk of being sanctioned during usplit. The outcomes we focus on
are Y 1(u)t and Y
0(u)
t as labour market status in month t if having been sanctioned during
stratum u and if not having been sanctioned during stratum u or before, respectively. For
each u we thus focus on a dynamic version of the average treatment effect on the treated
∆ATTt , i.e. the effect of being sanctioned in stratum u on the outcome at month t and we
estimate:
∆ˆATTt = E(Y
1(u)
t |D(u) = 1, L > usplit − 1, D1 = ... = Du−1 = 0)
−E(Y 0(u)t |D(u) = 0, L > usplit − 1, D1 = ... = Du−1 = 0) (8)
In order to use the dynamic matching approach above to create ex-post a setting that
comes closest to an experimental setting, the CIA has to be expanded by the dynamic
aspect. Accordingly we assume the dynamic version of the CIA (DCIA) to hold:
E(Y 0(u)t |Du = 1, L > usplit − 1, D1 = ... = Du−1 = 0;P (X))
= E(Y 0(u)t |Du = 0, L > usplit − 1, D1 = ... = Du−1 = 0;P (X)) 5.2 Dynamic matching
approach(A.3)
Thus we assume that conditional on the propensity score P (X), conditional on being at
risk of being sanctioned (L > usplit − 1) and conditional on not having been sanctioned
up to the beginning of the stratum considered (D1 = ... = Du−1 = 0), sanctioned and
non-sanctioned individuals are comparable in their outcomes (except for the realisations of
Du) during stratum u and in the months after.
5.3 Difference-in-Differences matching estimator
The usual matching estimators introduced so far rely on the data demanding (D)CIA.
Though we are confident that our data contain the relevant information so that it is highly
plausible that this assumption is satisfied, as a robustness check we introduce an estimator
which is able to tackle the problem of individual specific, time-invariant unobserved differ-
ences in the expected outcomes: the difference-in-differences matching estimator (DiD)
(Heckman/Ichimura/Todd, 1998):
∆ATTDiD = E(Y
1
after − Y 0before|X,D = 1)− E(Y 0after − Y 0before|X,D = 1), (9)
Using this estimator, time-invariant individual specific factors are eliminated, i.e. a bias due
to unobservables of this nature does not occur. As in our application we deal with a binary
outcome variable, the employment status, simply taking the differences before and after
treatment does not seem to be a reasonable exercise. Therefore we take advantage of
the panel-like structure of our data and calculate the individual-specific sum of the monthly
outcome variable over twelve months before and after treatment. Thus, we will estimate
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the following equation:
∆ˆATTDiD = E(
12∑
t=1
Y
1(u)
t −
−12∑
t′=−1
Y
0(u)
t′ |X,D(u) = 1, L > usplit − 1, D1 = ... = Du−1 = 0)−
E(
12∑
t=1
Y
0(u)
t −
−12∑
t′=−1
Y
0(u)
t′ |X,D(u) = 0, L > usplit − 1, D1 = ... = Du−1 = 0), (10)
where t indicates the months after treatment as introduced above and t′ refers to the
months before the start of the UI spell. Basically, we compare the difference in the sum of
the outcomes during the twelve months after treatment and before UI start of the treated to
the very difference of the untreated.
5.4 Details of the matching approach
The probit models for the estimation of the propensity scores are estimated by stratum u
for men and women. Those cases who left UI receipt before less than eight days are ex-
cluded from the analysis for two reasons: the remaining sample is expected to be less het-
erogenous and second doing so we can include two important covariates about placement
propositions received during the first week. We use the linear prediction of a probit model
of the probability of being treated given observed characteristics as propensity score.15
The results presented are based on nearest neighbourhood matching with five neighbours
with replacement with a caliper of 0.005 in order to avoid extremely bad matches.16 For
the analysis of stratum two and three, we exclude those UI recipients who have been
sanctioned during one and one or two respectively from the probit estimation (see equation
9). In order to make sure that UI recipients sanctioned by a short-term sanction were not
used as controls, we excluded those persons who have been sanctioned by a two-week
sanction during the respective stratum. Additionally we dropped those cases, where a
sanction was obviously taken back as it was shorter than seven days17.
The following matching restrictions were imposed: first a common support restriction18;
second we matched only those individuals who entered UI receipt in the same quarter
of calender time in order to align seasonal variations; third we excluded those individuals
from the pool of potential controls whose UI benefit receipt ended before the sanction
15 A linear prediction as balancing score has a higher discriminative power than the predicted probabilities as
the variances of the latter is much lower and may thus create more duplicates in terms of the propensity
score.
16 Nearest neighbour matching with one, three and five neighbours without caliper and with calipers 0.010 and
0.005 and a "95th-percentile caliper" was applied. The latter was the 95th percentile of the distribution of
the difference in the propensity score between treated and matched controls after a one to one matching
with replacement. Note the we use a linear prediction instead of the predicted probability. The decision for
the specification presented in this paper is based on the matching quality indicator MSB (see section 7.2)
and the number of treated lost. The results reported are sensitive to the choice of specification.
17 About 20% of sanctions fall in this category of non-effective sanctions (see figure 3).
18 The common support restriction causes observations to be dropped if their propensity score is higher than
the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the controls.
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starting date of the potentially matched treated (usplit).19 The standard errors are estimated
according to the following formula proposed by Lechner (1999b):
V ar =
V (Y (1)|D = 1)
N
+
∑
weight2 · V (Y (0)|D = 0)
N2
, (11)
where the sampling weights are obtained by the matching procedure and N is the number
of matched treated.20
6 Data
6.1 Sources
Our empirical analysis is based on administrative data of the federal employment agency
(FEA).21 The key feature of these data is that they contain daily information on the (un)-
employment history of every person in Germany.22 In order to build our sample we drew
400.000 persons who entered UI receipt between 1 April 2000 and 31 March 2001 in West
Germany out of the benefit recipient history. These persons had to be between 18 and
55 years old when they entered UI receipt and they had to have an employment spell
within twelve weeks before they got unemployed. By the latter restriction we tried to avoid
including persons who already were sanctioned due to a voluntary quit before they entered
unemployment as we were interested in effects of the first sanction. In order to build a set
of characteristics that yields the (D)CIA plausible we had to create an analysis dataset
containing a broad amount of information: of these randomly drawn persons we merged all
unemployment, employment, job seeking and ALMP program participation spells that were
found in the administrative data.23
We use three different outcomes: "regular employment", "other employment" and out of
labour force. Employment is regarded as regular if it is unsubsidised employment subject
to social contributions. "Other employment" might be subidised employment and implies
employment such as minor jobs or short term jobs. The outcomes (Y (u)t ) are either 1 if
the person is in employment (or out of labour force) or 0 otherwise.24 The outcome out of
labour force is built by screening all administrative data for whether a spell was found in a
19 In order to impose the latter restriction each stratum was divided into eight weeks and eight dummies were
build indicating in which week of the stratum the treated individuals were sanctioned. In the next step for
each week only those treated were kept that were sanctioned during the respective week and only those
controls that were still in UI receipt at the beginning of the respective week were kept.
20 As we use five neighbours matching, the usual sampling weight of the matched untreated is 0.2. In those
cases were only four neighbours were found, it is 0.25 etc.. If one control is used twice, the sampling weight
was e.g. 0.4.
21 The micro data were drawn from the benefit recipient history (LeH), the integrated employment biographies
(IEB) and an additional data base called ISAAK.
22 Provided the employment is subject to social insurance contribution or provided the person is registerd as
unemployed or as job seeker respectively.
23 For further information about the data sets used see Dundler (2006).
24 In order to build Y (u)t , first t*30.5 days are added to the individual UI spell start and stored as t-day. Second
all employment spells found were screened whether this t-day was within the spell - if yes Y (u)t was set to
1 if no, it was set to 0. In other words, only if the employment spell included the individual reference day
(t-day), it was counted as employment.
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labour market state, either employed, unemployed, job seeking or in an ALMP measure.
The data used in this study do not allow us to distinguish between a sanction due to refusing
training or a sanction due to refusing work. What we do observe in the data though is the
exact date of the imposition of the sanction. Thus we can draw the information about the
month when (if at all) the UI recipient was sanctioned relative to the start of UI receipt
(D(u)).
6.2 Plausibility of the matching assumption
In order to justify the (D)CIA, we have to observe all factors that jointly influence treatment
and our outcome of interest. The core of our argument is the richness of the available
data. According to Wilke (2004) the selection into an effective sanction follows a two-step
process: first, a sanction will be mainly imposed if the UI recipients is not able to prevent a
sanction e.g. by applying for the job offered in the placement proposition in such a way that
any potential employer is not interested in him. Second, as it is possible to file an objection
against a sanction meaning that it might become ineffective, those finally will be sanctioned
effectively who did neither file an objection or who were not successful in doing so. We
argue that the only difference between the groups of sanctioned and the non-sanctioned
after matching is an exogenous incidence, e.g. the caseworker "randomly" proposes a
job vacancy where the UI recipient refuses to apply. Accordingly the matched individuals
would have reacted the same way; simply they were lucky as to not having been offered
such a job vacancy.25 We base this argument on the observation of the abrupt jump of the
sanction rate in 2003 supporting the idea of exogenous variation in the individual sanction
probability (see section 3).
As the aim of the matching procedure is for each stratum u to create a sample wherein
a sanction is randomly imposed we have to control for a number of variables, namely all
variables that jointly influence the probability of being sanctioned during stratum u and the
labour market status during stratum u and later. We include information on age, on German
citizenship as well as on non-European citizenship.26 In order to control for heterogeneity
regarding the qualification between treated and controls we include the following variables:
the wage earned in the last job, dummies for the school education and for training qualifica-
tion, as well as for qualification level of the desired job as an indicator of the assessment of
qualification. In order to model the UI benefit recipient’s employment biography, we include
the cumulated duration of contributory employment27, of minor employment, of UI benefit
receipt, and of UA benefit receipt within half a year, one, two and three years previous to
UI receipt start. We control for the average duration of contributory jobs and the number of
different firms that the person had a contributory job at, both also in sets of variables cover-
ing half a year, one year, two and three years previous to UI start. Additionally, dummies for
the industrial sector and the firmsize of the last employer as well as for the job position held
in the last job are considered. The household context is controlled for by including marital
25 Note that we control for the number of placement propositions received during the unemployment spell in
order to control for a potential caseworker effect.
26 The reference group thus is non-German Europeans.
27 I.e. employment subject to social contribution.
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status and the age of the youngest child as dummies for three different age groups. We
control for the caseworker’s appraisal of potential health restrictions. Using time-varying
covariates we control for placement propositions received during the UI spell: for stratum
one we control for the number of placement propositions received during the first week of
the UI spell28; for stratum two we additionally control for placement propositions received
during stratum one (except those of the first week); for stratum three placement proposi-
tions received during stratum two are added to the probit model. In order to model the UI
benefit recipients regional flexibility, we include the expected commuting distance to the
previous job. A dummy variable indicating whether the person has been sanctioned dur-
ing the 12 months before UI start is included in order to capture heterogeneity among UI
recipients in terms of financial punishment experience. Finally, for stratum two and three
we include an indicator for whether the UI recipient holds an irregular job during the month
before the considered stratum starts.
On the regional level we control for unemployment rate and vacancy rate, each one month
before the individual UI spell starts, and we control for the caseload in the respective local
employment agency as the ratio between unemployed and caseworkers as average of the
year when the UI spell starts29 and for the sanction rate, defined as in Müller/Oschmiansky
(2006), one month lagged to the individual UI start.30
7 Empirical results
7.1 Descriptive evidence of UI sanctions
Table 4 describes the incidences of sanctions by gender and by stratum. We can see
that though the absolute numbers of sanctions decrease by each stratum, the probability
of getting sanctioned conditional on being at risk even increases slightly between stratum
one and two for both, men and women from 0.30% to 0.36% (men) and 0.21% to 0.26%
(women). In stratum three it slightly decreases: 0.34% (men) and 0.24% (women).
These results from the micro data support our earlier assessment: without conditioning on
any characteristics sanctions due to refusing work or an ALMP measure are rare events
during an individual UI receipt spell.
7.2 Matching quality
Tables 5 and 6 in the appendix report the results of the probit estimations. The depen-
dent variable is the probability of being sanctioned during the stratum considered. Table
7 presents indicators for the matching quality. Out of 2179 treated UI recipients, we lost
28 Note as mentioned above, we exclude those who left UI receipt before less than eight days.
29 The FEA human resource department provided us with this information.
30 Note that using the sanction rate as instrumental variable would not identify the ex post effect, but a local
average treatment effect (LATE; Angrist/Imbens/Rubin (1996)), which would include the ex ante effect.
Therefore we balance the differences of local sanction rates between treated and controls by including the
sanction rate in the matching procedure.
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73 due to the common support restriction or the caliper. McFadden’s R2 of the fitted probit
estimations before and after matching differ (before: ranging from 0.0806 to 0.1456), but
there is still some explanatory power in the models after matching (ranging from 0.0067
to 0.0278; column 6). The mean standardised bias31 as indicator of the distances in the
covariate distributions between treated and controls (ranging between 11.55% and 15.46%
before matching; column 7) is reduced (ranging between 1.96% and 3.20% after match-
ing; column 8) and is for each of these six subsamples below 5% which is regarded as
an acceptable level (cf. Caliendo/Kopeinig (2005)). The differences in the means between
treated and matched controls per covariate are all insignificant at a 5%-level (table 8 in the
appendix).
7.3 Ex-post effects
We will first discuss the results of the monthly ∆ATTt estimates and second the ∆
ATT
DiD
estimates as a robustness check. Additionally to ∆ATTDiD , in the appendix we provide ∆
ATT
Sum
estimates, where the outcome is the number of months in employment and out of labour
force respectively during a twelve-month period after the stratum considered.
Figures 4-9 in the appendix report graphically on the effect of a UI sanction for the months
after the sanction has been imposed. For men and women separately and for each out-
come used, a group of three graphics is presented: per stratum a graph of the monthly
differences in the outcome before treatment32 and the monthly ∆ATTt . The time axis rep-
resents the months from twelve months before UI receipt start until 18 months after the
end of the stratum considered, the time axis is presented relative to the start of the UI spell
(=0). Two vertical lines shall help to distinguish between the months before (left hand side
line) and after the stratum considered (right hand side line).
For women being sanctioned in stratum one or two (significantly) raises the probability
of being regularly employed in the months after the stratum considered. The significant
effects range between 5 and 10 %-points. Regarding the outcome "other employment" the
monthly ∆ATTt estimates suggest an ex post effect for stratum one and two with a time
lag. The significant effects on "other employment" are smaller (around 5 %-points). For
the outcome out of labour force we hardly find empirical evidence for women in terms of
monthly effects.33 Taking results of table 8 into account, we find a higher proportion of
UI recipients below 25 years to be sanctioned than older ones during stratum one and
two compared to stratum three. This might be a hint that young female UI recipients are
31 The mean standardised bias (MSB) is calculated as follows: MSB =
1
K
K∑
k=1
100 ·
| X¯k1t − X¯k0t |√
0.5 · (Vk1t(X) + Vk0t(X))
with K denoting the number of variables and X¯1 (V1) denoting the
mean (variance) in the treated group and X¯0 (V0) the mean (variance) in the comparison group before
matching if t = 0, and the corresponding moments after matching if t = 1 (cf. Caliendo/Hujer/Thomsen
(2005)).
32 We present the difference in the outcome before treatment in order to check graphically the quality of the
matches.
33 As being sanctioned will systematically lead to a disappearance from the administrative data for the duration
of the sanction, regarding the outcome out of labour force the monthly effects should be interpret only after
months three after the end of the stratum.
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more responsive to a sanction than older ones as in general the effects on employment for
stratum three are lower (see next section).
For men we observe a rise in the probability of being regularly employed immediately after
each stratum considered. For stratum one and two the monthly effects on the outcome
"other employment" are mostly negative. For men we find positive effects on the outcome
out of labour force for several months after the sanction.
In sum, both, men and women seem to respond to a sanction in terms of being regular-
ily employed after a sanction during stratum one or two. Regarding the outcome "other
employment", we find gender differences: while women in general are more likely to be in
"other employment" due to the sanction, the opposite is the case for men.
The graphical evidence is supported when looking at the ∆ATTDiD estimates (being the dif-
ference in the number of months after the stratum considered and before UI start during a
12 month period) in table 9 in the appendix: focussing on the significant effects only, we
find that for both, women and men, a sanction during stratum one or two raises the num-
ber of months of "regular employment" during the twelve month period after the stratum
considered (women: 0.66, 0.85, men: 0.60, 0.80). For women being sanctioned during
stratum two we additionally find a significant positive effect on the number of months of
"other employment" (0.6).34 For men being sanctioned during stratum one the negative
effect on "other employment" is even significant at a 10-%-level (-0.11, -0.15) and those
men being sanctioned during stratum two or three are more likely to be out of the labour
force.35
7.4 Ex-post effects - Evidence from subgroups
We used the same estimation procedure described above, starting from separate probit
models for each subgroup considered. We do not report the monthly ∆ATTt estimates but
only the ∆ATTDiD estimates. We divide our sample into UI recipients below 30 years and
above 29 years. Second, we analyse the subgroups of those being unemployed in a region
with lower and respectively higher unemployment rates.36
As the number of treated within the subgroups are quite small for stratum three, we only
report on the results of the first two strata. The matching quality indicators of the subgroup
estimates listed in table 10 in the appendix show that the matching quality naturally suffers
a bit by dividing the sample as the pools of potential controls are diminished. Out of the
16 subsamples, only of two the MSB after matching is below a value of 3% and of two it
is even higher than 5% (5.01 and 5.53). Table 11 in the appendix reports on the ∆ATTDiD
estimate per subgroup, stratum and for men and women.37
34 For the ∆ATTDiD and the ∆
ATT
Sum estimates the twelve months starting from the fourth month after the stratum
considered are counted (see comment above).
35 Note that never differing in terms of their sign, the ∆ATTSum estimates only differ slightly in size (and signifi-
cance). This finding supports the matching quality indicators which suggest good matching quality.
36 We take the median to split the sample.
37 In order to save space the probit coefficient tables of the subgroup analysis are not included in this paper.
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Our results suggest that for women the effects on "regular employment" found for the first
stratum are indeed driven by young women, while older women seem to be more respon-
sive in terms of "other employment". Also the positive (though insignificant) effect found
for the outcome out of labour force is driven by older women (while for the younger group
though not being significant they are even negative). For men it is also the subsample of
younger UI recipients that is more responsive to the financial incentive of a sanction regard-
ing the number of months in "regular employment" afterwards. Regarding the outcomes
"other employment" and out of labour force both male age groups seem to react in a similar
way. The latter result might be a hint that a sanction causes an increase in the probability
to work in the shadow economy.
Dividing the sample by the regional unemployment rate we find that for the outcome "regu-
lar employment" especially for women in better off regions sanctions have an effect (1.03,
.72). For men on the other hand being sanctioned during stratum one in a worse off re-
gion is much more effective (0.82) than in better off regions (0.04). This seems to be an
interesting finding as to one might ask whether the effectiveness of sanctions does not
only depend on the individual reaction but also depend on the labour market conditions.
Women in worse off regions being sanctioned in stratum one on the other hand respond to
a sanction by taking up "other employment". The significant negative effect of a sanction
during stratum one on the outcome "other employment" for men seems to be driven by the
subgroup living in worse off regions (-0.33).
In sum, for men and women we find that the effect of a sanction on the months in "regular
employment" is driven by the younger UI recipients. The results regarding the subgroups
defined by the local unemployment rate appear somewhat erratic.
8 Conclusion and outlook
In this paper we use administrative data in order to evaluate the ex post effect of sanc-
tions due to refusing work or an active labour market policy (ALMP) measure for a sample
of individuals who entered unemployment insurance (UI) benefit receipt in West Germany
during April 2000 and March 2001. We identify the ex post effect using a matching ap-
proach that takes timing of the treatment explicitly into account: we model the effects of
a sanction imposed during either of three strata consisting each of two months on the
employment probability in each out of twelve months after the end of the stratum consid-
ered. As a robustness check we introduce a difference-in-differences matching estimator.
A potential influence of unobserved time-invariant characteristics is eliminated thereby. In
order to avoid biases due to time-varying characteristics we include potentially confound-
ing factors, namely variables on whether a person took up an irregular job and the number
of placement propositions he or she received during the pre-treatment UI period and are
confident that the identifying assumption holds. In order to give some insights into different
subgroups we finally distinguish the sample by age and by local labour market conditions.
The outcome states we consider are holding a regular job, holding an irregular job and
being out of the labour force.
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This study is based on a sample which was faced with a sanction regulation framework
different to the one existing today. Compared to the currently effective regulation, where the
first sanction imposed due to refusing a training or an active labour market policy (ALMP)
measure is a 100% benefit reduction lasting for three weeks only, in 2000/2001 a UI benefit
sanction implied a 100% benefit reduction for twelve weeks. We suppose that this is part of
the reason why the numbers of incidences and the sanction probability respectively were
extremely low during our observation period.
For both, men and women, we find evidence of an average ex post effect of a UI sanction
during stratum one or two on the "regular employment" probability. These effects are mainly
driven by young UI recipients. Regarding the outcome "other employment" the results are
ambigous: for women they are positive, but negative for men. Taking the subgroups into
account, we find that the positive effect on "other employment" for women results from the
older subgroup while the negative effect for men (for stratum one) is found largest in regions
with relatively higher unemployment rates. With respect to the outcome out of labour force,
especially older women seem to respond to sanctions, while among men especially those
having been sanctioned during stratum two or three withdraw from the labour market.
The differences in the effects between the three different strata considered might partly be
traced back to a dynamic sorting process, i.e. it is different types of persons a) who are at
risk of being sanctioned and b) who are sanctioned during stratum three compared to the
first two strata.
The results are in line with the empirical literature on ex post effects of unemployment
benefit sanctions summarized in section 2: on average a sanction has a positive effect
on the employment outcome. As we saw in section 4, job search theory suggests the
causal mechanism to work via a decrease in the reservation wage and an increase in
the search intensity. Both might affect the quality of post-unemployment jobs. Though
the estimation framework used in this paper gives some hints about the stability of the
employment taken up after a sanction, future research should investigate the effects of
unemployment benefit sanctions on the quality (e.g. in terms of wages and qualificational
level) and the sustainability of post-unemployment jobs (e.g. analysing the job duration of
the first job after a sanction).
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A Appendix
Table 1: UI entitlement length in 2000/2001
age in years employment in months during 7
years previous to UI receipt (SC
III, §124, §127)
UI entitlement length in
months
<45 12 6
<45 16 8
<45 20 10
<45 24 12
≥ 45 30 14
≥ 45 36 18
≥ 47 44 22
≥ 52 52 26
≥ 57 64 32
Source: Social Code (SC) III - Employment Promotion. 4th edition (February
15 2001). Text edition, Nuremberg (Federal Employment Agency).
Table 2: Sanction legislation in 2000/2001
Type Duration Notes Reduction
(1) Voluntary quit At least 1/4 of UI duration (≥
twelve weeks)
6 weeks in case of hard-ship, 3
weeks if the job had ended any-
way within 4 weeks
100%
(2) Refusal of work twelve weeks 3 weeks if a temporary (<6 weeks)
job was refused
100%
(3) Refusal of ALMP measure twelve weeks 3 weeks if integration measure < 6
weeks
100%
(4) Drop out ALMP measure twelve weeks 3 weeks if integration measure < 6
weeks
100%
(5) Failure to report to job cen-
ter or to medical / psychological
appointment (Säumniszeit)
2 weeks 2. failure: 4 weeks 100%
Source: Social Code (SC) III - Employment Promotion. 4th edition (February 15 2001). Text edition, Nuremberg
(Federal Employment Agency).
Table 3: Sanction rates by sanction types in West Germany 1996-2006*
Year Absolute num-
bers total
(1) Voluntary quit (2) Refusal job (3) Refusal
ALMP measure
(4) Drop out of
ALMP measure
1996 205744 88,4 5,8 3 2,8
1997 214021 85,1 8,2 3,6 3,1
1998 241076 80,7 10,8 4,1 4,4
1999 255095 78,6 11,9 4,3 5,2
2000 237228 75,7 15,4 4,3 4,6
2001 244851 75 17,7 3,3 3,9
2002 252592 73,2 18,7 4 4,1
2003 331141 58 34 4,4 3,7
Source: Labour Market 2003; Official Announcements of the Federal Employment Agency 52. Special Edition, July 15
2004, Nuremberg. *Note: Short-term sanctions due to not showing up at the job center are missing as there are no
official statistics on this sanction type until 2005.
IAB-Discussion Paper 43/2008 26
Figure 1: Yearly sanction rates in Germany 1996-2003
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Note: Short-terms sanctions due to not showing up at the job center are missing as there
are no official statistics on this type of sanctions until 2005.
Table 4: Sanctions: number of incidences, number of persons at risk and sanction proba-
bilities
Stratum (month
of UI receipt)
Treated Potential
controls
Sanctions conditional on
being at risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women:
1 (1-2) 312 147199 0.21%
2 (3-4) 263 101710 0.26%
3 (5-6) 165 68935 0.24%
Men:
1 (1-2) 644 217472 0.3%
2 (3-4) 518 142945 0.36%
3 (5-6) 277 81272 0.34%
The table reports the number of sanctions due to refusal of a job or refusal of an ALMP measure. Source: Administrative
micro data of benefit recipients (LeH).
Figure 2: Distribution of sanction starts
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Figure 3: Distribution of starts of non-effective sanctions (i.e. < 7 days)
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Table 5: Probit estimates - women
Stratum 1 2 3
Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E.
age 18-24 ´ 0.408*** (0.080) 0.647*** (0.114) 0.515*** (0.141)
age 25-29 0.222*** (0.084) 0.483*** (0.113) 0.405*** (0.134)
age 30-34 0.161* (0.084) 0.364*** (0.114) 0.172 (0.143)
age 35-40 0.172** (0.081) 0.330*** (0.109) 0.206 (0.138)
age 41-45 -0.071 (0.094) 0.285** (0.113) 0.216 (0.144)
daily wage in last job in Euro -0.003*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001)
child 0-3 in household -0.179* (0.097) -0.159* (0.092) -0.013 (0.108)
child 4-11 in household -0.292*** (0.079) -0.154* (0.080) -0.090 (0.090)
child 12-17 in household -0.086 (0.083) -0.041 (0.093) -0.027 (0.107)
sanction history (no. in last 1 year) 0.208 (0.199) 0.074 (0.332)
German citizen -0.016 (0.093) 0.047 (0.118) -0.025 (0.138)
non European citizenship 0.159 (0.106) 0.148 (0.132) 0.037 (0.159)
no vocational degree 0.025 (0.056) 0.060 (0.066) 0.060 (0.076)
school degree: low 0.413*** (0.091) 0.136* (0.080) 0.074 (0.095)
school degree: middle 0.274*** (0.093) 0.060 (0.082) -0.015 (0.099)
desired job: low or no qualification -0.031 (0.068) 0.018 (0.087) 0.050 (0.085)
desired job: middle qualification -0.035 (0.073) -0.024 (0.092) -0.068 (0.081)
desired job: fulltime -0.030 (0.058) 0.056 (0.064) -0.056 (0.071)
marital status: married -0.023 (0.045) 0.037 (0.050) 0.017 (0.060)
health problems (caseworker’s assessment) -0.515*** (0.130) -0.383*** (0.130) -0.187 (0.126)
local unemployment rate 0.062*** (0.017) 0.032 (0.020) -0.009 (0.026)
local share of long-term unemployed among u.e. 0.017*** (0.007) -0.004 (0.007) 0.005 (0.009)
local vacancy rate 0.409* (0.241) -0.045 (0.263) -0.847** (0.355)
local share of UI recipients among u.e. 0.023*** (0.007) -0.002 (0.007) 0.002 (0.009)
caseload in local employment agency -0.004 (0.005) -0.016*** (0.005) -0.008 (0.006)
sanction rate in local employment agency 0.424*** (0.074) 0.396*** (0.092) 0.314*** (0.117)
commuting distance to last job in 10 km -0.004 (0.003) -0.007* (0.004) -0.001 (0.005)
UI eligibility duration in months -0.005 (0.006) 0.026*** (0.008) 0.010 (0.011)
irregular job in month 2 after UI start 0.218*** (0.077)
irregular job in month 4 after UI start 0.177** (0.085)
no. placement propositions received in week 1 0.053 (0.046) -0.098 (0.076) 0.100** (0.045)
any placement proposition received in week 1 0.086 (0.140) 0.344** (0.167) -0.033 (0.178)
no. placement propositions received in stratum 1 0.044*** (0.007) 0.012 (0.017)
any placement proposition received in stratum 1 0.318*** (0.048) 0.199*** (0.065)
no. placement propositions received in stratum 2 0.034*** (0.012)
any placement propositions received in stratum 2 0.245*** (0.061)
Constant -5.863*** (0.682) -3.077*** (0.750) -3.518*** (0.912)
Variables controlled for in each estimation:
-dummies for industrial sector
-cumulated duration of contributory jobs for each of three years
-average durations of contributory jobs (half a year - three years history)
-number of firms of contributory jobs (half a year - three years history)
-cumulated UI benefit receipt (half a year - three years history)
-outcome in month -1 until -12 previous to UI start
-dummies for job position in last job
-cumulated UA benefit receipt (half a year - three years history)
-dummies for firmsize of previous employer
-cumulated duration of minor jobs for each of three years
McFadden’s R2 0.083 0.124 0.114
log likelihood -2009.599 -1578.352 -998.764
N 144711 100136 67618
Note: This table reports on the coefficient estimates for the treatment probits per stratum considered. For stratum one, cases where the duration of UI receipt was less
than eight days as well as those cases were a sanction was imposed during the first seven days are excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
***: 1%; **: 5%; *:10%
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Table 6: Probit estimates - men
Stratum 1 2 3
Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E. Coefficients S.E.
age 18-24 ´ 0.359*** (0.067) 0.454*** (0.082) 0.564*** (0.117)
age 25-29 0.242*** (0.067) 0.430*** (0.081) 0.479*** (0.113)
age 30-34 0.116* (0.069) 0.255*** (0.080) 0.375*** (0.112)
age 35-40 0.020 (0.070) 0.265*** (0.080) 0.228** (0.116)
age 41-45 0.056 (0.074) 0.075 (0.091) 0.161 (0.122)
daily wage in last job in Euro -0.002*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.000 (0.001)
child 0-3 in household -0.176*** (0.063) -0.110 (0.069) -0.038 (0.089)
child 4-11 in household -0.059 (0.058) -0.017 (0.065) 0.084 (0.084)
child 12-17 in household -0.097 (0.091) -0.205* (0.119) 0.107 (0.115)
sanction history (no. in last 1 year) 0.290*** (0.087) 0.294** (0.120) 0.207 (0.174)
German citizen 0.030 (0.067) 0.008 (0.073) -0.060 (0.089)
non European citizenship 0.197*** (0.072) 0.058 (0.080) -0.072 (0.101)
no vocational degree -0.016 (0.041) 0.080 (0.049) 0.129** (0.062)
school degree: low 0.201*** (0.066) 0.164** (0.077) 0.093 (0.102)
school degree: middle 0.128* (0.071) 0.185** (0.081) 0.042 (0.112)
desired job: low or no qualification 0.004 (0.049) 0.071 (0.073) 0.064 (0.086)
desired job: middle qualification 0.078 (0.053) 0.070 (0.076) 0.080 (0.086)
desired job: fulltime -0.364*** (0.106) 0.125 (0.201) 0.169 (0.223)
marital status: married -0.086** (0.039) -0.054 (0.048) -0.113* (0.062)
health problems (caseworker’s assessment) -0.303*** (0.075) -0.338*** (0.090) -0.156* (0.093)
local unemployment rate -0.014 (0.013) 0.002 (0.015) 0.022 (0.021)
local share of long-term unemployed among u.e. 0.018*** (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.008 (0.008)
local vacancy rate -0.205 (0.190) 0.032 (0.210) -0.007 (0.292)
local share of UI recipients among u.e. -0.001 (0.005) 0.004 (0.006) 0.002 (0.008)
caseload in local employment agency -0.011*** (0.003) -0.009** (0.004) -0.008 (0.005)
sanction rate in local employment agency 0.369*** (0.058) 0.426*** (0.068) 0.261** (0.102)
commuting distance to last job in 10 km -0.002 (0.002) -0.005 (0.003) -0.004 (0.005)
irregular job in month 2 after UI start 0.019 (0.074)
irregular job in month 4 after UI start 0.081 (0.085)
UI eligibility duration in months -0.016*** (0.005) 0.007 (0.006) 0.021** (0.008)
no. placement propositions received in week 1 0.005 (0.025) 0.014 (0.040) 0.015 (0.034)
any placement proposition received in week 1 0.262*** (0.077) 0.173 (0.117) 0.135 (0.138)
no. placement propositions received in stratum 1 0.058*** (0.006) -0.024 (0.016)
any placement proposition received in stratum 1 0.385*** (0.039) 0.125** (0.054)
no. placement propositions received in stratum 2 0.048*** (0.011)
any placement propositions received in stratum 2 0.324*** (0.050)
Constant -2.567*** (0.544) -3.647*** (0.599) -4.318*** (0.871)
Variables controlled for in each estimation:
-dummies for industrial sector
-cumulated duration of contributory jobs for each of three years
-average durations of contributory jobs (half a year - three years history)
-number of firms of contributory jobs (half a year - three years history)
-cumulated UI benefit receipt (half a year - three years history)
-outcome in month -1 until -12 previous to UI start
-dummies for job position in last job
-cumulated UA benefit receipt (half a year - three years history)
-dummies for firmsize of previous employer
-cumulated duration of minor jobs for each of three years
McFadden’s R2 0.081 0.146 0.110
ll -3979.721 -2878.260 -1606.563
N 213521 140497 79506
Note: This table reports on the coefficient estimates for the treatment probits per stratum considered. For stratum one, cases where the duration of UI receipt was less
than eight days as well as those cases were a sanction was imposed during the first seven days are excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
***: 1%; **: 5%; *:10%
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Table 7: Balacing quality indicators
Stratum Treated
lost
Controls
used
McFadden’s R2 McFadden’s R2 MSB MSB
Before After Before After
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Women:
1 11 1459 .0825 .0162 12.96 2.46
2 11 1192 .1239 .0203 14.8 3.06
3 8 738 .114 .0278 12.8 3.2
Men:
1 9 3076 .0806 .0067 14.69 1.96
2 23 2288 .1456 .0126 15.46 2.34
3 11 1241 .1097 .0189 11.55 2.26
Propensity score matching with five neighbours and replacement, common support and a caliper
of 0.005. For the formula of the meas standardised bias (MSB) see footnote 31.
Table 8: Matching quality indicators per covariate
Covariate Mean
Treated
Mean
Controls
%bias bias re-
duction
t-test: p-
value
Women: stratum one
UI eligibility duration in months 316.55 324.64 -5.5 77.2 0.465
age 18-24 .34219 .3049 9.0 82.9 0.331
age 25-29 .15615 .18224 -7.3 15.9 0.396
age 30-34 .13621 .13693 -0.2 98.4 0.980
age 35-40 .16611 .17265 -1.7 83.8 0.832
age 41-45 .06312 .05433 3.0 88.6 0.649
daily wage in last job in Euro 39.857 39.529 1.2 93.8 0.860
no. placement propositions received in week 1 .0897 .0936 -0.7 94.9 0.930
any placement proposition received in week 1 .04319 .04248 0.4 97.3 0.966
child 0-3 in household .06977 .08796 -6.9 -4.8 0.411
child 4-11 in household .08638 .09749 -3.4 86.2 0.639
child 12-17 in household .06645 .0677 -0.5 95.6 0.951
local unemployment rate 7.1067 7.0705 1.5 92.6 0.861
local share of long-term u.e. 36.8 36.454 5.3 59.9 0.536
local vacancy rate .19644 .19772 -1.1 95.4 0.899
local share of UI 59.904 60.183 -2.9 88.3 0.739
caseload in local employment agency 517.27 514.84 2.9 88.6 0.712
sanction rate in local employment agency .78219 .77783 1.7 95.3 0.854
desired job: fulltime .74086 .7307 2.2 89.7 0.779
sanction history (no. in last 1 year) .00664 .00897 -2.2 77.1 0.747
German citizen .83056 .81488 4.7 82.1 0.617
non European citizenship .12625 .13891 -4.4 82.6 0.649
commuting distance to last job in 10 km 1.9194 1.888 0.5 94.8 0.946
no vocational degree .38206 .39545 -2.8 84.3 0.738
school degree: low .69435 .69838 -0.8 97.4 0.915
school degree: middle .25581 .24949 1.4 83.9 0.859
desired job: low or no qualification .48837 .48838 -0.0 100.0 1.000
desired job: middle qualification .53156 .5233 1.7 73.0 0.840
marital status: married .39867 .42761 -5.8 74.9 0.474
health problems (caseworker’s assessment) .01661 .01896 -1.1 96.1 0.829
Women: stratum two
UI eligibility duration in months 336.64 342.11 -3.9 74.4 0.618
age 18-24 .32143 .31714 1.1 98.1 0.918
age 25-29 .17063 .1688 0.5 96.1 0.957
age 30-34 .15476 .14502 2.6 56.3 0.762
age 35-40 .15873 .16399 -1.4 90.5 0.874
age 41-45 .09127 .09833 -2.2 87.0 0.789
daily wage in last job in Euro 38.425 36.317 7.7 52.1 0.307
irregular job in month 2 .15079 .17869 -8.4 45.0 0.403
no. placement propositions received in week 1 .06746 .06743 0.0 99.9 0.999
any placement proposition received in week 1 .04365 .03924 2.6 82.1 0.806
no. placement propositions received in stratum 1 2.0992 1.7115 14.9 76.2 0.114
any placement proposition received in stratum 1 .63492 .60405 6.6 90.8 0.480
child 0-3 in household .11508 .12746 -4.0 -149.4 0.673
child 4-11 in household .11508 .14007 -7.1 63.1 0.405
child 12-17 in household .06349 .05855 1.8 85.5 0.818
local unemployment rate 7.1288 7.1277 0.0 99.8 0.996
local share of long-term u.e. 36.182 35.906 4.1 70.1 0.651
Table continued next page
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local vacancy rate .19034 .18943 0.8 96.5 0.927
local share of UI 59.423 59.564 -1.5 91.2 0.873
caseload in local employment agency 512.08 510.8 1.6 95.9 0.846
sanction rate in local employment agency .79135 .78603 2.0 95.5 0.832
desired job: fulltime .70635 .70096 1.1 95.6 0.896
sanction history (no. in last 1 year) .00397 .00813 -7.4 -184.7 0.613
German citizen .85714 .85322 1.2 92.4 0.901
non European citizenship .10714 .11398 -2.5 86.7 0.808
commuting distance to last job in 10 km 1.5995 1.5154 1.5 87.9 0.834
no vocational degree .36111 .40123 -8.5 -1.4 0.358
school degree: low .61508 .63922 -4.9 55.3 0.579
school degree: middle .28175 .27851 0.7 3.1 0.936
desired job: low or no qualification .47619 .48519 -1.8 77.8 0.841
desired job: middle qualification .54762 .53575 2.4 24.8 0.791
marital status: married .43254 .44664 -2.8 89.1 0.752
health problems (caseworker’s assessment) .02381 .0309 -3.1 89.1 0.629
Women: stratum three
UI eligibility duration in months 349.15 349.72 -0.4 98.1 0.968
age 18-24 .20382 .17441 8.4 78.4 0.510
age 25-29 .19108 .20548 -4.0 82.5 0.752
age 30-34 .15924 .16109 -0.5 92.9 0.965
age 35-40 .19108 .21143 -5.1 29.7 0.656
age 41-45 .12102 .11508 1.8 78.1 0.872
daily wage in last job in Euro 34.261 33.41 3.0 86.2 0.748
irregular job in month 4 .18471 .19887 -3.9 79.5 0.752
no. placement propositions received in week 1 .07006 .05348 3.8 77.0 0.740
any placement proposition received in week 1 .03185 .02761 2.7 79.7 0.827
no. placement propositions received in stratum 1 1.2548 1.1293 7.6 82.2 0.574
any placement proposition received in stratum 1 .51592 .48555 6.4 87.1 0.594
no. placement propositions received in stratum 2 1.5605 1.4808 4.2 92.2 0.766
any placement proposition received in stratum 2 .57962 .58406 -0.9 98.4 0.937
child 0-3 in household .17197 .17863 -1.9 83.6 0.878
child 4-11 in household .15287 .17051 -4.7 58.9 0.674
child 12-17 in household .07643 .06496 4.2 42.1 0.695
local unemployment rate 7.1831 7.0976 3.5 82.1 0.745
local share of long-term u.e. 35.783 35.55 3.6 66.4 0.743
local vacancy rate .17072 .17296 -2.3 65.6 0.829
local share of UI 59.376 59.526 -1.6 89.1 0.887
caseload in local employment agency 524.06 521.02 3.8 85.7 0.717
sanction rate in local employment agency .74847 .74181 2.5 92.2 0.836
desired job: fulltime .56688 .52506 8.4 -75.8 0.461
sanction history (no. in last 1 year) 0 0 0.0 100.0 .
German citizen .8535 .87572 -6.8 62.2 0.569
non European citizenship .10191 .09538 2.4 86.7 0.848
commuting distance to last job in 10 km 1.9643 1.9636 0.0 99.8 0.999
no vocational degree .38854 .41269 -5.0 62.4 0.666
school degree: low .64968 .62986 4.0 70.3 0.717
school degree: middle .24204 .24597 -0.9 87.5 0.936
desired job: low or no qualification .49682 .53459 -7.6 39.4 0.507
desired job: middle qualification .49682 .45567 8.2 -22.9 0.470
marital status: married .52229 .54845 -5.3 66.8 0.646
health problems (caseworker’s assessment) .04459 .04157 1.1 94.1 0.896
Men: stratum one
UI eligibility duration in months 291.27 293.19 -1.4 96.1 0.773
age 18-24 .37008 .36341 1.6 96.9 0.805
age 25-29 .2189 .21832 0.1 99.2 0.980
age 30-34 .15276 .15433 -0.4 94.9 0.938
age 35-40 .11496 .11087 1.1 95.4 0.818
age 41-45 .07559 .07874 -1.1 93.7 0.834
daily wage in last job in Euro 54.674 54.08 2.1 94.6 0.647
no. placement propositions received in week 1 .11339 .10604 1.6 89.7 0.810
any placement proposition received in week 1 .05984 .0564 1.7 90.7 0.794
child 0-3 in household .05669 .05039 2.4 82.6 0.618
child 4-11 in household .07244 .07171 0.2 98.7 0.960
child 12-17 in household .02047 .0252 -2.5 87.0 0.573
local unemployment rate 7.263 7.3225 -2.5 83.4 0.645
local share of long-term u.e. 37.63 37.866 -3.6 75.3 0.494
local vacancy rate .17502 .17598 -1.0 93.9 0.861
local share of UI 58.139 57.732 4.3 -76.5 0.431
caseload in local employment agency 520.25 519.45 1.0 95.4 0.843
sanction rate in local employment agency .76847 .77146 -1.2 97.1 0.840
desired job: fulltime .97953 .97365 4.8 44.5 0.489
sanction history (no. in last 1 year) .02677 .0189 5.9 60.4 0.391
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German citizen .75591 .74703 2.2 90.4 0.715
non European citizenship .19843 .20824 -2.8 88.8 0.664
commuting distance to last job in 10 km 2.0654 2.0626 0.0 99.3 0.993
no vocational degree .3811 .40247 -4.5 56.9 0.436
school degree: low .79055 .78184 2.0 85.0 0.705
school degree: middle .15748 .16336 -1.6 -73.5 0.776
desired job: low or no qualification .48976 .51121 -4.3 53.7 0.445
desired job: middle qualification .54646 .52155 5.0 -76.1 0.374
marital status: married .28031 .28108 -0.2 99.6 0.976
health problems (caseworker’s assessment) .02992 .03528 -2.4 89.0 0.591
Men: stratum two
UI eligibility duration in months 315 315.73 -0.6 97.8 0.918
age 18-24 .28485 .26795 4.2 89.3 0.553
age 25-29 .25051 .25859 -2.0 92.6 0.771
age 30-34 .16768 .16983 -0.6 84.6 0.928
age 35-40 .16768 .16646 0.3 96.7 0.959
age 41-45 .05657 .05758 -0.3 98.6 0.945
daily wage in last job in Euro 55.063 55.19 -0.4 98.7 0.930
irregular job in month 2 .05859 .06414 -2.4 -1187.8 0.716
no. placement propositions received in week 1 .09899 .0797 4.1 74.9 0.541
any placement proposition received in week 1 .04646 .04798 -0.9 95.2 0.911
no. placement propositions received in stratum 1 2.3434 2.241 3.9 94.8 0.580
any placement proposition received in stratum 1 .70303 .7103 -1.6 98.3 0.802
child 0-3 in household .07879 .08064 -0.7 87.1 0.914
child 4-11 in household .09495 .09845 -1.1 90.7 0.852
child 12-17 in household .01616 .01535 0.4 98.2 0.919
local unemployment rate 6.9881 7.0146 -1.1 97.3 0.858
local share of long-term u.e. 36.083 36.224 -1.9 81.8 0.740
local vacancy rate .19316 .19012 2.9 91.7 0.667
local share of UI 59.841 59.457 3.7 14.5 0.521
caseload in local employment agency 513.44 515.46 -2.5 92.8 0.674
sanction rate in local employment agency .78897 .7921 -1.1 98.0 0.868
desired job: fulltime .99394 .99384 0.1 98.4 0.984
sanction history (no. in last 1 year) .01818 .01303 4.2 61.4 0.548
German citizen .76566 .75414 2.9 86.5 0.672
non European citizenship .1798 .18646 -1.9 90.0 0.787
commuting distance to last job in 10 km 1.7671 1.868 -1.7 81.9 0.760
no vocational degree .41616 .44024 -5.0 57.5 0.445
school degree: low .76566 .7397 6.0 -98.5 0.344
school degree: middle .1798 .20121 -5.8 47.4 0.391
desired job: low or no qualification .51313 .53761 -4.9 30.8 0.441
desired job: middle qualification .51515 .49448 4.1 -43.4 0.516
marital status: married .32121 .32158 -0.1 99.8 0.990
health problems (caseworker’s assessment) .02626 .03071 -1.9 93.3 0.675
Men: stratum three
UI eligibility duration in months 331.85 342.03 -7.4 59.6 0.357
age 18-24 .26316 .26497 -0.5 98.9 0.962
age 25-29 .22932 .2136 4.1 83.6 0.663
age 30-34 .19549 .18459 2.8 27.8 0.749
age 35-40 .1391 .12481 3.8 78.6 0.627
age 41-45 .07519 .08346 -2.7 86.8 0.725
daily wage in last job in Euro 57.677 56.984 2.5 84.9 0.735
irregular job in month 4 .08271 .08703 -1.6 72.3 0.858
no. placement propositions received in week 1 .07519 .05959 4.2 65.4 0.662
any placement proposition received in week 1 .03759 .03252 3.2 74.7 0.751
no. placement propositions received in stratum 1 1.0677 .94749 8.0 75.5 0.382
any placement proposition received in stratum 1 .45865 .44768 2.3 94.0 0.800
no. placement propositions received in stratum 2 1.8534 1.7079 7.7 88.4 0.477
any placement proposition received in stratum 2 .63158 .62914 0.5 99.3 0.954
child 0-3 in household .08647 .09129 -1.7 43.2 0.845
child 4-11 in household .10526 .11241 -2.3 70.9 0.792
child 12-17 in household .03759 .04135 -1.8 82.7 0.824
local unemployment rate 7.5607 7.5434 0.7 96.3 0.934
local share of long-term u.e. 36.329 36.173 2.2 -226.0 0.797
local vacancy rate .17465 .17458 0.1 99.6 0.994
local share of UI 58.3 58.26 0.4 95.1 0.961
caseload in local employment agency 532.18 531.36 1.0 95.7 0.906
sanction rate in local employment agency .7218 .73534 -5.0 85.1 0.573
desired job: fulltime .99248 .99323 -0.7 91.5 0.918
sanction history (no. in last 1 year) .01128 .01491 -3.6 61.5 0.738
German citizen .76316 .77362 -2.6 81.6 0.775
non European citizenship .16541 .16165 1.1 88.6 0.907
commuting distance to last job in 10 km 1.7749 1.7687 0.1 98.9 0.989
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no vocational degree .46241 .46949 -1.4 90.1 0.870
school degree: low .79699 .79417 0.7 95.0 0.936
school degree: middle .1391 .14568 -1.9 1.8 0.829
desired job: low or no qualification .53759 .5683 -6.1 3.6 0.477
desired job: middle qualification .4812 .4547 5.3 -81.2 0.541
marital status: married .34211 .34398 -0.4 98.7 0.964
health problems (caseworker’s assessment) .05263 .05113 0.5 97.7 0.938
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Figure 4: Women - Outcome: "regular employment"
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Figure 5: Women - Outcome: "other employment"
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Figure 6: Women - Outcome: out of labour market
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Figure 7: Men - Outcome: "regular employment"
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Figure 8: Men - Outcome: "other employment"
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Figure 9: Men - Outcome: out of labour market
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Table 9: ∆ATTD iD and ∆
ATT
sum estimates for three different outcomes
Estimand Stratum (month of UI
receipt)
Outcome:
"regular
employment"
Outcome:
"other
employment"
Outcome:
out of labour
force
Outcome:
"regular
employment"
Outcome:
"other
employment"
Outcome:
out of labour
force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women: Men:
∆ATTsum : 1 (1-2) .67** .28* .26 .58*** -.13* .21
2 (3-4) .72** .51** .16 .78*** -.15* .53***
3 (5-6) .33 .26 .16 .39 .07 .48**
∆ATTDiD : 1 (1-2) .66* .27 .35 .6** -.11* .23
2 (3-4) .85** .6** .31 .8*** -.15* .64***
3 (5-6) .21 .28 .17 .42 .05 .47*
Note: Results of regression in matched sample with only treatment indicator as regressor and weights attached to controls. Robust standard errors. Significance
levels: *: 10% ; **: 5% ; ***: 1% ; Dependent variables: ∆ATTsum : Number of months in employment during 12 months after stratum, and respectively months
4-15 after (out of labour market); ∆ATTDiD Dependent variable of ∆
ATT
sum minus number of months in employment during 12 months before UI start.
IAB-Discussion Paper 43/2008 38
Table 10: Balacing quality indicators for subgroup analysis
Stratum Subgroup Treated Treated
lost
Controls
used
McFadden’s
R2
McFadden’s
R2
MSB MSB
Before After Before After
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Women:
age 18-29 1 160 23 638 .0936 .0465 11.95 3.84
2 130 11 531 .1188 .0472 13.19 4.47
age 30-55 1 152 17 655 .0806 .0415 11.81 4.32
2 133 19 535 .1249 .0646 12.95 5.53
Local unemployment rate low 1 174 23 723 .109 .035 13.96 4.4
2 138 16 544 .174 .0442 17.35 3.21
Local unemployment rate high 1 138 19 573 .0951 .0511 11.87 4.22
2 125 13 500 .143 .0658 12.88 5.01
Men:
age 18-29 1 379 26 1713 .0542 .0131 10.37 2.63
2 280 28 1148 .1205 .0301 11.37 3.38
age 30-55 1 265 29 1158 .0807 .0208 13.44 3.13
2 238 20 1028 .1603 .0256 16.56 3.69
Local unemployment rate low 1 307 23 1364 .0977 .0185 16.65 2.92
2 300 30 1217 .1708 .0281 16.49 3.45
Local unemployment rate high 1 337 35 1481 .0933 .0202 14.18 3.17
2 218 20 945 .1372 .0225 14.65 3.4
Local unemployment rate low: below the median; local unemployment rate high: above or equal the median. The median were: 6.90 (women stratum one), 6.88 (women stratum two),
6.89 (men stratum one) and 7.22 (men stratum two).
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Table 11: ∆ToTATTDiD estimates for subgroups and for three different outcomes
Subgroup Estimand Stratum Outcome:
"regular em-
ployment"
Outcome:
"other em-
ployment"
Outcome:
out of labour
force
Outcome:
"regular em-
ployment"
Outcome:
"other em-
ployment"
Outcome:
out of labour
force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women: Men:
age 18-29 ∆ATTsum : 1 .79* .09 -.21 .54** -.09 .12
2 1.38*** .21 -.21 .95*** -.11 .41*
age 30-55 1 .3 .55** .35 .31 -.28** .35*
2 .11 .59 .49 .58* -.12 .42*
Local unemployment rate low 1 .85** -.02 .32 -.12 .06 .74***
2 .69 .57 .16 .97*** -.15 .16
Local unemployment rate high 1 .06 .59** -.15 .83*** -.34*** -.07
2 .51 .06 -.01 .44 -.08 .73***
age 18-29 ∆ATTDiD : 1 .73 .15 -.1 .58* -.07 .17
2 1.32** .37 -.37 .98** -.12 .51*
age 30-55 1 .48 .55* .3 .32 -.29** .38*
2 .19 .56 .59* .55 -.08 .56**
Local unemployment rate low 1 1.03** .07 .32 .04 .06 .75***
2 .72 .96** .28 1.08*** -.17 .2
Local unemployment rate high 1 -.24 .78** -.16 .82** -.33*** -.04
2 .67 .08 .02 .61 * -.09 .81***
Note: Results of regression in matched sample with only treatment indicator as regressor and weights attached to controls. Robust standard errors. Significance levels: *: 10% ; **:
5% ; ***: 1% ; Dependent variables: ∆ATTsum : Number of months in employment during 12 months after stratum, and respectively months 4-15 after (out of labour market); ∆
ATT
DiD :
Dependent variable of ∆ATTsum minus number of months in employment during 12 months before UI start.
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